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A new international NGO voice on CCS

2011-12-08T22:34:00Z

George Peridas, Scientist, Climate Center – San Francisco

A new international NGO network has just been announced (press release here), comprising some of the world's leading environmental advocacy organizations, which will focus on the topic of Carbon Capture & Sequestration (CCS). NRDC is part of this group.

The group's member organizations have all been working on CCS for a while now. CCS is a technically and scientifically involved subject, and NRDC has spent over 13 years studying the specifics of this technology. The groups' coming together under the umbrella of the network, however, comes from the common understanding that CCS needs to make a meaningful dent in reducing the world's carbon pollution, and that this must be done safely and effectively without endangering human health or the environment.

It is our hope that the network will provide a robust and credible international voice on CCS that is based on sound science rather than ideology, and also enhance knowledge sharing and cooperation between our respective continents (Australia, Europe and North America).

CCS can be controversial at times. Its main application lies with fossil fuels, which are not favorites among NGOs. It has often been used by some players in industry, who want CCS to be "tomorrow's technology forever", as a smokescreen to carry on with business as usual on fossil fuels. Despite all this, it remains an important piece of the puzzle when it comes to combating climate change. Fossil fuels will not go away in a hurry, and we need solutions to deal with the vast quantities of carbon pollution that they emit to the atmosphere.

Under this common belief, we hope that the new network can help advance national and international policy and regulatory developments that will make CCS a climate mitigation reallity, and that will ensure that we pick the best sites and operate them well.

California's Carbon Capture & Storage (CCS) Review Panel releases its recommendations

2011-01-21T20:59:28Z

George Peridas, Scientist, Climate Center – San Francisco

In order to better understand the statutory and regulatory barriers to the use of carbon capture and storage technology as a strategy in combating climate change, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), California Energy Commission (Energy Commission), and the Air Resources Board (ARB) created a CCS Review Panel in February 2010. The Panel, composed of members from industry, trade groups, academia, and environmental organizations, was asked to:

Identify, discuss, and frame specific policies addressing the role of CCS technology in meeting the State’s energy needs and greenhouse gas emissions reduction strategies for 2020 and 2050.
Support development of a legal/regulatory framework for permitting proposed CCS projects consistent with the State’s energy and environmental policy objectives.

I had the honor of serving on the Panel, which concluded its work in December of 2010. The final recommendations were released this week. See: news release, recommendations, full list of documents

California is a leader among states in the nation to curb carbon pollution with strong near- and long-term emission reduction goals under its landmark law AB32, and supportive policies to promote energy efficiency, renewable energy, clean cars, low carbon fuels and smart growth, as well as its emissions performance standard for new baseload power. The state’s goals are realistic but ambitious. A number of tools and technologies will be needed for these goals to be met, and the Panel’s job was to examine the potential role of CCS more closely, identify barriers to its development and make recommendations for how to overcome them, if appropriate.

The Panel agreed that CCS is an important tool for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and that the technology exists to do this safely and effectively today. CCS was identified as one of many options that can reduce emissions, but an important one given its application to fossil fuels, the use of which is still dominant in the state, the nation and the world, and highly problematic from a carbon standpoint. The challenge comes in two forms: ensuring that the main barriers to CCS are addressed so that the technology can contribute in a meaningful way to emission reductions before 2050, and doing so in a way that does not contradict the state’s efforts on energy efficiency, the renewable portfolio standard (RPS) and the established loading order for meeting growing energy needs (which puts efficiency and renewables ahead of other solutions).

Removing barriers is, of course, delicate business. No technology enjoys a barrier-free ride in the marketplace and the policy realm, even though wish lists are often long. It is important that the state use a light-handed approach as much as possible, and only address those barriers that truly stand in the way of technology deployment rather than a long laundry list which some would like to see removed. I am happy to report that my fellow panelists were also appreciative of the balance that needed to be struck here. (One panelist of the ten – Mr. Coddington – submitted a supplement to the Panel’s recommendations. The views contained in that document are entirely his own and do not reflect the beliefs of the Panel as a whole – they should not be viewed as part of the consensus recommendations.)

The Panel’s recommendations cover regulatory, legal, economic and social aspects of CCS. On the regulatory front, the Panel first of all recommended that the state officially recognize the CO2 reductions from safe and effective CCS. This means nothing more than treating sequestered CO2 as sequestered and not emitted under state laws and policies. In fact, ARB, at its meeting on December 16, 2010 where it adopted California’s cap-and-trade program also adopted a resolution “to initiate a public process to establish a protocol for accounting for sequestration of CO2 through geologic means and recommendations for how such sequestration should be addressed in the cap and trade program”. It therefore looks as if an accounting protocol to that effect will be forthcoming, which was another of the Panel’s recommendations.

Late in 2010, USEPA promulgated two rules concerning CCS. The first deals with how wells are permitted under the Underground Injection Control Program (UIC) and aims to safeguard groundwater when CO2 is being injected, and the second imposes monitoring, reporting and verification requirements under the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Rule. These two rules cover many of the regulatory bases for permitting geologic sequestration wells, and the Panel recommended that the state analyze the extent of those rules, and decide whether to request primary enforcement authority from USEPA and administer the new UIC rule through a designated state agency. However, the promulgation of these two rules does not mean that there is nothing more that California should be doing on the regulatory and permitting front. The Panel further recommended that California “[c]oordinate the development of performance standards for CCS sites that would include design requirements and other operational measurements consistent with the goals of protecting the groundwater and preventing emissions of CO2 to the atmosphere”. These performance standards could be in the form of, say, a goal of x% retention over y years, which would then inform proper site selection, project design and operation, in essence filtering good sites from bad ones. Such standards would potentially go beyond what USEPA has already required.

The Panel further recommended that the California Energy Commission (CEC) be designated as the CEQA lead agency for CCS projects. This would put CEC in the coordinating role for coming up with mitigation measures for potential environmental impacts from these projects, assigning tasks to the relevant agencies with the most expertise as needed. The idea behind this recommendation is to have one agency with an umbrella task to look at possible environmental impacts, and to ensure a holistic consideration of such impacts rather than an uncoordinated or piecemeal approach through various agencies.

The Panel also made some legal recommendations on CCS-related issues. The first entails codifying in statute what is already strongly established in common law, viz. that the surface land owner also owns the microscopic pore spaces in the subsurface rock where CO2 will be injected. This would unambiguously establish the land owners as the holders of those rights, and aid in their fair compensation for the use of those rights by developers. Projects will almost invariably need the consent of many owners to carry out an injection, of course, since CO2 plumes will likely span many properties. Currently, developers need to negotiate access with all the individual land owners. Some have expressed concern that this familiar scenario might delay projects and needed emission reductions, so the Panel recommended that the legislature consider alternative ways of gathering the needed rights while also compensating owners for the use of those rights. A number of solutions exist here. In my opinion, light-handed approaches that give land owners control, such as an appropriate unitization scheme would be preferable to measures such as eminent domain or condemnation which could also undermine the public reception that the technology would get, and which suffer from equity issues. The same applies more or less to the siting of CO2 pipelines, where the Panel made a similar recommendation. Before deciding on the way forward, California’s policy makers should consult closely and widely with the land owners to ensure that solutions are vetted in advance and are acceptable.

In order to ensure the long-term integrity and safety of storage sites, the Panel recommended the establishment of an industry-funded trust fund, which would be used by an appropriate state agency to monitor and maintain decommissioned sites. This is an important step that would go beyond current federal structures and requirements. California should not accept a situation whereby sites are closed but no entity is tasked with keeping an eye on them. It should also be noted that the Panel did not recommend that California assume the long-term liability for decommissioned storage projects – maintaining the status quo would hold operators responsible for their actions under existing laws and regulations.

On the subject of economic incentives for CCS, the Panel did not have the time to analyze all the possible options. Such incentives need to be studied in the context of other policy priorities and the current fiscal situation. However, we do believe that appropriate incentive mechanisms could be found, and that the state should consider these in the near future. The federal government arguably has a larger role to play here, but with the failure to enact climate legislation in Congress last year, a major chunk of CCS incentives disappeared from the horizon. California might still have a role to play in kick starting early projects in order to enable deeper emission cuts later. The Panel further recommended that any cost allocation mechanisms for CCS project should be spread as broadly as possible across all Californians. To this I would add that low income individuals should be afforded adequate protection from any such costs. Along related lines, the Panel recommended that permitting authorities endeavor to reduce, as much as possible, any disparate impacts to residents of any particular geographic area or any particular socio-economic class.

Finally, the Panel supported a well-thought-out and well-funded public outreach program to ensure that the risks and benefits of CCS technology are effectively communicated to the public. This is an area where NRDC has focused considerable attention over the past few years. CCS technology, its risks and its benefits are still not well understood by the public, and opinions are often formed based on other dimensions of industrial development history in the vicinity of a proposed project, or from news articles of varied accuracy and quality. It would be important to establish an objective repository of information and experts that the public could access if it had queries on CCS technology and its application.

In summary therefore, the Panel agreed pretty much uniformly on the value of CCS as part of a broader mitigation portfolio for the state, and subject to the constraints and sensitivities that should govern its deployment. California has an established track record on energy efficiency, renewable energy and clean cars, and it is expected that these solutions will continue to form the backbone of emission reductions. However, deployment of CCS could complement these solutions effectively under the appropriate policy framework, helping the state to achieve its targets. Enabling those reductions through CCS relies on strategically addressing some key barriers. As a final note, I would like to thank my fellow panelists and our leader, Carl Bauer, for their work, as well as the tireless and proficient technical team for their invaluable support.

Dispelling controversy at the Weyburn geologic carbon dioxide storage project

2011-01-13T21:22:00Z

George Peridas, Scientist, Climate Center – San Francisco

Recent press reports call attention to complaints by a local family that Canadian government agencies and the operator of the Weyburn carbon dioxide storage project in Saskatchewan, Canada have not responded satisfactorily to requests for investigation of apparent chemical contamination of their property. CO2 has been injected into the Weyburn oil field since 2000 (see here and here).

While a group of governmental and academic institutions have conducted extensive monitoring of this project over the last decade, with all information indicating the injected CO2 has not leaked from the underground trapping formation, the complaints of the family warrant a prompt and thorough inquiry by independent experts, as well as the publication of the results of such an investigation.

In addition to legitimate private interests of the local property owners, there is considerable public interest in a prompt and adequate reponse to the concerns reflected in the press reports. Underground CO2 injection is a technology that is still in relative infancy. While broad scientific consensus on geologic trapping indicates that large volumes of CO2 can be safely injected and permanently retained in deep underground formations, and the track records of the small number of large-scale monitored projects has reinforced this (Weyburn being one of these projects), public confidence in this technology is not well-established.

The way to build that confidence is for both private operators and governmental bodies to be ready to respond promptly to reports of contamination near CO2 injection projects with available data documenting the location of injected CO2. Further, these organizations must support a thorough independent assessment of such reports when available information does not immediately establish that no leakage has occurred. That is what we recommend should be done in response to the claims of contamination near the Weyburn site.

Carbon sequestration and groundwater - thoughts on a recent Duke study

2010-11-22T11:06:32Z

George Peridas, Scientist, Climate Center – San Francisco

If geologic formations are to be used to keep carbon dioxide (CO2) out of the atmosphere, it is essential that we know what the potential leakage pathways are, and establish effective rules to ensure that injected CO2 stays permanently trapped. It is also essential to know if any harm could result if CO2 were to migrate from the formations where it is injected into drinking water aquifers.

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) researchers have pointed out since the beginning of the study of the topic that if CO2 were to leak from injection formations into groundwater supplies, chemical reactions could result in the release of harmful contaminants, potentially rendering the groundwater unsafe for human use. A number of studies have demonstrated the potential for such contamination – in simple terms – by soaking specimens of typical groundwater rock in CO2 solutions.

For this reason, scientists and policymakers studying CCS have called for rigorous requirements for licensing any future CO2 injection operations. These requirements include criteria for site selection aimed at avoiding sites where significant pathways might exist that could not be eliminated, and monitoring, verification and reporting requirements for injection operations to ensure that injection projects will not result in risks to any groundwater resources. With those requirements in place, extensive study, as well as practical experience with projects, suggests very strongly that no CO2 leakage should be expected.

The most important aspect of this defense in depth approach is to limit injection projects to deep formations, much deeper than any groundwater resources and to assure that secure barriers of impermeable rock layers are located between the CO2 injection zone and any nearby groundwater resources. This approach is often not well understood, with the result sometimes being that routine studies providing more information on the chemical contamination that CO2 could produce if it leaked and came into contact with groundwater are treated as news by the popular media and generate alarm in the blogosphere.

The recent coverage in Climatewire and the New York TImes regarding one such study by Duke University are good examples of how coverage of these studies can lead to mistaken impressions about what scientists know about the risks of CO2 injection and what policymakers are doing to assure that such risks are avoided when and if future CCS projects go forward.

The Duke study essentially confirmed what has appeared a number of times in published scientific literature for almost a decade: that CO2 in groundwater could mobilize potentially dangerous trace elements and constituents (see, for example, here, and here). This is not a new finding. The study is a simple leaching experiment that identifies which elements may be of concern. It confirms previous results and is an example of research that needs to be done to address the potential impacts of groundwater quality if CO2 leaks from a storage reservoir into a drinking water aquifer.

However, the study is not the complete picture. For example, it does not identify key geochemical reactions that control trace element groundwater chemistry or the rates of these reactions. Without this information, it is not possible to deduce how fast these elements might be released, groundwater quality as a function of time, the spatial extent of those releases, and whether groundwater flow or other factors would render the increased concentrations at hazardous levels temporary or localized. Further work is needed in these areas, and some experiments currently under way are expected to yield valuable results.

It is worth noting that in excess of 35 million tons per year of CO2 are being injected today in the U.S. for enhancing production in oil fields. The regulatory framework for larger scale injection projects to isolate CO2 captured from power plants and other large sources will be much more rigorous than current EOR regulatory practice. The operating permits for sequestration projects under the Class VI Underground Injection Control rule that EPA is preparing to promulgate any day now are specifically designed to prevent any such migration out of the containment zone. This does not mean that leaks are impossible. But the risks are manageable and proper enforcement – which we should strive for – will prevent leaks.

The flip side of the coin from the study is that the documented changes in geochemistry can be used to monitor for leaks. Monitoring for these geochemical signatures and increased concentrations of trace elements or constituents can provide a proactive tool for the early detection of leaks and timely intervention. Current results suggest that these monitoring methods are sensitive and effective (see here).

Finally, the study seems to suggest that areas with aquifers that have a high potential of contamination in the event of a leak should not be selected as sequestration sites. This might be prudent in some cases, but a decision like this should be made on the basis of a full risk assessment that considers all parameters for the site. For example, a site with multiple seals that would make an excellent trap for CO2 but is overlaid by such an aquifer might yet be preferable to a site with poor sealing qualities but more benign geochemistry.

Obama CCS Task Force releases its report

2010-08-13T23:20:19Z

George Peridas, Scientist, Climate Center – San Francisco

On February 3, 2010, President Obama established an Interagency Task Force on Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) with the goal of developing a comprehensive and coordinated Federal strategy to speed the commercial development and deployment of carbon capture and storage technologies in line with the Administration’s goals for climate protection and a goal of bringing five to ten commercial demonstration projects online by 2016. The Task Force delivered its report this week, after six months of work which involved expert panel presentations, public meetings and, no doubt, numerous internal meetings. Back in February, we called for openness and transparency, and for the Task Force to resist reiterating the claims of special interest groups. It appears that they struck the balance, solicited wide input, and reached sound conclusions.

The main conclusions in the report should come as no surprise, but it is nonetheless important that a large joint effort like this one came to these conclusions. On the issue of technological readiness and the main impediment for CCS deployment, the Task Force concluded that:

"The lack of comprehensive climate change legislation is the key barrier to CCS deployment";
"A climate policy designed to reduce our Nation’s GHG emissions is the most important step for commercial deployment of low-carbon technologies such as CCS, because it will create a stable, long-term framework for private investments";
"Technologies exist for all three components of CCS".

The Task Force rightly identified the prime factor that is hindering CCS deployment right now: the lack of comprehensive climate legislation with a price and limits on carbon pollution. This cannot be overstated. It is ironic, therefore, that some of the foremost promoters of CCS technology and the term "clean coal" also lobbied hard to block the same piece of legislation that would allow this technology to stand on its own two feet. If you sense a calculated stalling tactic and a hypocritical stance, then you are not far from the truth: the mantra of "tomorrow's technology forever" may just allow polluters to squeeze in another few years without controls or penalties.

The Task Force also hinted at what the legislation needs to look like in order to make CCS a reality. According to Administration analyses, apparently, "CCS technologies will not be widely deployed in the next two decades absent financial incentives that supplement projected carbon prices". This is in line with NRDC's (and USCAP's) position of offering selective incentives for early movers, which decline over time, to overcome the initial price tag of the technology and bring costs down to more manageable levels.

Pointing out the key role of climate legislation without suggesting interim incentives until enactment has left some disappointed - understandably. However, we have to question the prudence of directing incentives beyond today's limited ones at CCS in the absence of such legislation. CCS is a carbon control technology, and has no purpose outside a climate regime. Taxpayer dollars are better spent elsewhere if such legislation is not forthcoming. Nor should tax credits or other incentives take away from the impetus of enacting a broad bill that would cap emissions and contain the necessary incentives for CCS.

The Task Force was careful not to paint a rosy picture. "While there are no insurmountable technological, legal, institutional, regulatory or other barriers that prevent CCS from playing a role in reducing GHG emissions", it states, "early CCS projects face economic challenges related to climate policy uncertainty, first-of-a-kind technology risks, and the current high cost of CCS relative to other technologies". Speaking from experience, engineers enjoy a challenge. I have confidence that they will live up to it and deliver tomorrow's technological options that enable cheaper and widespread deployment. For today though, let's not forget that CCS can be deployed using existing options, even though one day we might view them as clumsy.

On the regulatory front, a lot of the missing pieces are about to be put into place. The EPA is currently finalizing its Underground Injection Control rule for CO2 injection, as well as its supplement to the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Rule for CO2 injection and geologic sequestration sites. Those two together will answer many of the remaining questions. A few will likely remain, including anxiety about post-closure liability for sequestration sites. On that front, we whole-heartedly agree with the Task Force's findings:

"Existing Federal and State legal framework should be adequate for at least an initial group of five to ten commercial-scale projects";
"Additional analysis is needed to determine the most appropriate legal or regulatory structures for addressing potential long-term liabilities associated with widespread deployment";
"Open-ended Federal indemnification should not be used to address long-term liabilities associated with CO2 storage".

It is extremely encouraging that the Task Force did not simply echo in its recommendations the requests by some parties for open indemnification of sequestration site owners and operators after site closure. Instead, it presents opposing viewpoints and begins an analysis of the inherent tensions on this issue, deferring to 2011 for further conclusions on the issue until it has conducted further analysis. As I had outlined in a previous post on the Rockefeller-Voinovich CCS bill, we should think long and hard before handing out liability relief for closed sequestration sites. The pitfalls of doing so could be great, the need still debatable, and the nuances in the nature of the requested relief from rudimentary to non-existent.

For those following CCS in depth, the report might not have shed any new light, although it is concise, well written and a very useful volume. Those expecting the Administration to take the future of CCS in its hands and deliver a bright future at one fell swoop through this report will be disappointed - but they should have been looking at (and talking to) the U.S. Congress instead. We continue to look at Congress, and the Senate in particular, to deliver on its duty to safeguard the economy, our well being and the environement through the passage of climate legislation. Until then, CCS will have to hold its breath and make progress underwater.

Sens. Rockefeller & Voinovich release their Carbon Capture and Storage Deployment Act

2010-07-16T19:10:07Z

George Peridas, Scientist, Climate Center – San Francisco

Senators Rockefeller (D, WV) and Voinovich (R, OH) released their Carbon Capture and Storage Deployment Act this week. This is an ambitious proposal that would help the technology to be deployed at a wide scale. A good few of the provisions are similar to those that we have seen in the various climate bills to date. Context is important, however, and some provisions are new or noteworthy, so let's take a closer look.

Very briefly, the bill:

Devotes up to $0.85 billion to research and development programs for CCS;
Funds early CCS projects through a wires charge on fossil-based electricity generation, by collecting around $2 billion/yr for up to 10 years. This is along the lines of the Waxman-Markey provisions passed last year by the House, which survived in the Kerry-Boxer and Kerry-Lieberman proposals in the Senate.
Extends existing loan guarantees of up to $20 billion for projects related to CCS infrastructure (with fairly loose eligibility criteria), as well as tax credits, for up to 10 gigawatts (of which half can be in industrial, non-power sector projects) of CCS deployment;
Creates an incentive program for up to 62 gigawatts of CCS capacity, through tax credits and bond interest payment assistance;
Creates a new emissions performance standard for new coal-fired powered plants initially permitted between 2010-2020;
Creates a post-closure liability relief regime and trust fund for injection projects.

CCS can be an important technology for climate mitigation. This is something that NRDC has believed for a long time, and we do not disagree with the Senators here. However, while we have been supporting large-scale deployment of CCS technologies, we see no real prospect for deployment on the scale contemplated by this legislation in the absence of policies that limit carbon pollution. Taxpayers will rightly question why we should devote such large subsidies to a carbon control technology like this if Congress has not decided to place limits on carbon. At a total of around $200 billion, enacting a program like this largely on taxpayers' backs as opposed to funding it through carbon allowances within a cap is unwise.

It is also unclear how the significant capacity of plants that is contemplated in the bill would fund its ongoing operating costs in the absence of a cap and price on carbon - assistance with capital costs helps, but without an ongoing signal, investment in these plants might still remain uneconomical.

An even stronger contradictory signal would be sent if Congress were to pass Senator Rockefeller's separate proposal to delay and interfere with EPA Clean Air Act rules to cut carbon pollution. The performance standard for new coal plants in the CCS bill also does not extend beyond 2020, in contrast to the equivalent standard in Waxman-Markey or the Senate climate bills.

Another provision of this CCS bill that we believe must be modified is the provision for post-closure liability relief for geologic sequestration projects. Such liability relief could lead to design decisions and operational practices that create avoidable risks, and that could result in damages decades later. Holding corporations liable for their decisions is an important means of avoiding risky short-term decision making. A well sited, designed and operated sequestration project will likely carry a very low risk and the liability implications for such projects are so low that commercial risk management instruments like insurance should be entirely sufficient to make the projects viable over the long term.

The task today is to make executives, investors and insurers familiar with this practice and its risks. There are prudent and measured ways of helping the market develop that do not involve such broad liability relief provisions and that avoid the real danger of creating moral hazard. Ironically, a sweeping liability relief provision will undermine public confidence in the relatively novel technique of carbon sequestration by creating a perception that the risk is much higher than it actually is.

Bryce's turn to get it wrong on CCS

2010-05-21T07:02:41Z

George Peridas, Scientist, Climate Center – San Francisco

What is it about “do-it-all thinkers” trying their hand at bashing carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) lately? After the Economides couple tried to convince the world in the face of unanimous scientific and stakeholder outcry that their musings had settled the impossibility of storing CO2 underground, now Robert Bryce offered his views in a New York Times op-ed. The picture is very much the same: simplistic arguments and even myths are used to “settle the debate once and for all”. It seems that the whole world has got it wrong again...

The IPCC and the hundreds of geologists, engineers and other scientists who worked on the Special Report on CCS in 2005, as well as environmentalists around the world, the oil industry and the power industry – they have all apparently made mistakes that thinkers new to CCS can readily point out. Granted, some might see this as a fashionable area of research or academic musings, but it is disappointing to see that some basic facts are being missed. Interestingly, Bryce seems to have common (conservative?) ground with Economides in believing that green energy is oversold and unfeasible. You are entitled to your own opinion, gentlemen, but not to your own facts…

Let’s get to the substance of Bryce’s arguments though. He makes three claims: that CCS uses too much energy, that pipelines cannot carry the volumes of CO2 that would be captured from power plants and industrial facilities, and that there isn’t sufficient space in the subsurface to dispose of this CO2.

CCS does use additional energy – there is no denying that. A 10% reduction in the efficiency of a power plant is not unreasonable to expect in the early years. Bryce’s figure, as well as being high, ignores that CO2 is captured for a purpose, and also the benefits of doing so. Keeping the CO2 from being emitted to the atmosphere has distinct environmental benefits – much like scrubbing sulfur and nitrogen oxides, particulates and mercury – all of which take some energy. What Bryce also seems to miss is that this is not an energy penalty that will be applied to the whole electricity or industrial sector. It will be applied only to those plants that use CCS, which will be outnumbered by non-CCS plants for some time. There are numerous other ways to reduce emissions, and CCS is only part of the mix – and is unlikely to be the most significant part (almost all analyses forecast that energy efficiency will be the main pillar of the needed reductions).

As far as pipelines go, Bryce misinterprets a PNNL study which essentially says the opposite of what he claims. Unlike oil and gas pipelines which transport those commodities over long distances from the point of production to value markets and the point of end use, there is no fundamental reason to transport CO2 over long distances. A CO2 pipeline only needs to be long enough to take CO2 from its point of capture to the nearest or most economical geologic depository. A mapping of CO2 sources and sinks in the U.S. presented in the PNNL paper that Bryce mentions, states that 95% percent of the largest stationary CO2 sources are within 50 miles of existing storage sites, and that only 6,000 miles pipeline would need to be built before 2030 to enable CCS deployment that is consistent with climate stabilization. By comparison, over 3,900 miles of pipelines transport CO2 in the U.S. today, and 270,000 miles of large inter- and intra-state natural gas pipeline was built between 1950 and 2000.

In terms of capacity, or space, to dispose of the CO2, Bryce is again grossly out in his estimates. As Sarah Forbes of WRI points out here, the DOE has estimated the overall potential for storage in the US to be at 3,600 to 12,900 billion metric tons of CO2, which is several orders of magnitude higher than the total annual CO2 emissions of the entire U.S. which are roughly equal to 6 billion metric tons. Not all of this capacity will be realized, of course. Economic, geologic and other factors may render some of it unsuitable. But that still leaves us with substantial space to bury CO2, despite Bryce’s seemingly impressive metrics in terms of supertanker volumes.

As to his last point – public resistance – he might be on to something. CCS will not be met with universal support, nor will it be met with universal opposition. Its fate will depend on the track record of pilot projects, the effectiveness of the regulatory system, local attitudes towards climate change and towards holes in the ground, as well as accurate information on the technology, its benefits and its risks.

If you are looking for such information, please ignore Mr. Bryce (with all due respect, of course). If you can be in Sacramento on June 10th, come to our joint workshop to listen to leading scientists on this topic instead.

Economides (x2) try their hand at CCS - and get it wrong

2010-04-29T08:20:21Z

George Peridas, Scientist, Climate Center – San Francisco

Michael Economides and Christine Ehlig-Economides recently published a paper, which according to them contained a revelation. The world's scientists had got geological storage of carbon dioxide (GS) all wrong. The paper asserts that its implications "are profound" and concludes that GS is "a profoundly non-feasible option for the management of CO2 emissions". What is even more profound is the unanimity in which scientists, research bodies and stakeholders around the world have refuted the claims made by the paper.

Michael Economides, a compatriot of mine, is no stranger to limelight. An active blogger on energy matters, he also admits to being something of a climate change skeptic. He is featured in Sen. James Inhofe's (a radical Oklahoma senator who famously called climate change "the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American people") list of 400 scientists who question climate change. He has questioned green jobs, while claiming that drilling will transform the economy, "positioning our nation for a cleaner, more secure energy future". His wife, Christine Ehlig-Economides is a respected petroleum engineer and professor in Texas.

It is obvious that neither of them are strangers to the oil industry and storing fluids in the subsurface. However, this time they simply got it wrong. Quick to rebut their claims were the European Technology Platform for Zero Emission Fossil Fuel Power Plants (ZEP), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Edinburgh University, Imperial College and the American Petroleum Institute (links to rebuttal documents included).

Here are some excerpts from these documents:

"We consider this to be a serious misrepresentation of the scientific, engineering and operational facts surrounding CCS" [ZEP]

"From this narrow analysis, the authors make sweeping conclusions that are not relevant to the general feasibility of CCS." [LBNL]

"The conclusions asserted by the Ehlig-Economides and Economides paper are flawed and stand in stark contrast to the enormous body of literature and field experience on CO2 injection and storage in the subsurface." [PNNL]

"This paper includes a number of mis-statements and erroneous base assumptions which could lead readers to arrive at inappropriate conclusions regarding the role that CCS can play in addressing CO2 emissions" [API]

The rebuttal documents are united in pointing out the basic flaws of the Economides' analysis (WRI has also posted a response here):

The availability of storage reservoirs is far greater than assumed (the authors, for example, rule out outcropping aquifers and "open" reservoirs, when both types are capable of secure storage);
Many reservoirs are thicker that the authors assume;
The assumed storage efficiency (or the % of pore space that the injected CO2 will occupy) is very low;
Dissolution of CO2 is not as slow as is assumed.

It also turns out that when more realistic assumptions are plugged into the Economides' calculations, the conclusions are very different, indicating that, for example, the Mt. Simon formation in the Illinois basin alone could store around 16 billion tons of CO2 - roughly double the amount of U.S. annual emissions today, and representative of some estimates for how much mitigation would come from CCS alone by 2050.

The couple also go so far as to call into question the success of established CCS projects like Sleipner, with scant justification. Even though it is not the first time this happens, these claims are unjustified as I explain here.

One has to wonder how they expected a paper as flawed as this this to withstand scientific scrutiny, or what the motivation behind its publication is. Once again, and as was the case for climate change, the IPCC's conclusions stand intact: the world is likely to have sufficient storage capacity for decades to centuries worth of emissions.

Let's hope that the transition to a truly sustainable energy system will not take that long, obviating the need for CCS. But for now a pressing climate problem calls for its deployment alongside other solutions.

Obama Administration establishes Carbon Capture & Storage Task Force

2010-02-04T22:28:39Z

George Peridas, Scientist, Climate Center – San Francisco

Yesterday, President Obama issued a memorandum directing several of his department and agency chairs to come together and works towards a Comprehensive Federal Strategy on Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS).

Under the memorandum, an Interagency Task Force is established, which is to be co-chaired by the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The Task Force is given 180 days to develop “a proposed plan to overcome the barriers to the widespread, cost-effective deployment of CCS within 10 years, with a goal of bringing 5 to 10 commercial demonstration projects online by 2016”.

The Administration’s assessment of the needs around CCS is right on the mark: CCS is recognized as one of the (many) key technologies needed to curb global warming pollution, and as a technology that is ready to begin commercial deployment today if the relevant regulatory and economic barriers are addressed. Established interest groups have vigorously been pushing an agenda of perpetual research & development in the area of CCS, as part of an effort to delay its deployment and thereby argue that climate legislation is ill-advised (because, allegedly, no carbon emissions control technology for coal – the nation’s primary electricity production fuel – is commercially available yet). Thankfully, the President seems fully aware of the broad scientific consensus (by bodies such as the IPCC and MIT) and agreement among key stakeholders in the industry sector and environmental groups, that CCS technology can begin safe and effective deployment today. His goal of ensuring that commercial demonstration projects come online by 2016 is therefore worthy. In practical terms, taking into account the siting, permitting, financing and construction logistics for such plants, this means that projects need to begin development... now.

The Task Force’s remit is clearly very broad. Specifically, it is asked to:

explore incentives for commercial CCS adoption;
address any financial, economic, technological, legal, institutional, social, or other barriers to deployment;
consider how best to coordinate existing administrative authorities and programs, including those that build international collaboration on CCS; and
identify areas where additional administrative authority may be necessary.

These priorities again seem to recognize that the main barriers standing in the way of CCS deployment right now are economic and regulatory, with a view to addressing them as soon as possible.

On the incentive side, the memorandum gives the ultimate answer already: “[u]ltimately, comprehensive energy and climate legislation that puts a cap on carbon pollution will provide the largest incentive for CCS because it will create stable, long-term, market-based incentives to channel private investment in low carbon technologies”. This is something that NRDC and others have been arguing for some time now. Without a means to bridge the economic gap that CCS projects face today, deployment will remain from limited to non-existent. An economy-wide cap on emissions that sets a price signal on carbon pollution and provides additional incentives for CCS deployment in the early years is urgently needed.

In the meantime, as Congress enters the final stretch towards enacting such legislation, the Task Force has the potential to recommend and coordinate agency action on a number of remaining items that can affect CCS deployment. Such items include:

Deepening cooperation with China and other key countries where low-hanging fruit CCS opportunities exist and where the U.S. can offer expertise and funding;
Improving our knowledge on the nation’s underground CO2 storage capacity, with specific focus and on-site characterization in key basins around the country;
Clarifying who owns the subsurface pore space where the CO2 will be injected, and devising fair and equitable means that enable developers to obtain such rights while safeguarding and rewarding the owners of those rights;
Clarifying leasing procedures and safeguards for CCS under Federal lands;
Finalizing regulations by the EPA to govern injection of CO2, and both safeguard groundwater and prevent any emissions to the atmosphere from injection sites, for all leading types of storage reservoir (this involves EPA exercising both its Safe Drinking Water Act authority and its Clean Air Act authority to set siting, operational, monitoring, verification, accounting, reporting and closure requirements for all of the following: deep saline formations, gas fields and oil fields); and
Ensuring that an appropriate entity is tasked with the stewardship of geologic sequestration sites after injection ceases and the sites are closed, and is adequately funded to carry out these duties.

So the announcement of Task Force is both timely and welcome. However, a word of caution is in order. The work of the Task Force must be transparent, inclusive, and not fall hostage to special interests. Moreover, there can be a tendency for task forces like these to produce a laundry list of topics that need to be addressed. It is important for this Task Force to confine itself to what is truly necessary and prudent, and not suggest the removal of “barriers” to bad regulation and irresponsible behavior. Only then will CCS be able to earn the public’s trust.

Carbon Capture & Sequestration in China: Ripe for the Picking

2009-10-21T03:53:55Z

George Peridas, Scientist, Climate Center – San Francisco

It's the Year of the Ox. And the Ox likes low-hanging fruit. On Friday last week NRDC released the Executive Summary of a report that examines the potential for near-term Carbon Capture & Sequestration opportunities in China. The full report will be released over the coming few weeks.

Why CCS? Why China? My colleague and co-author, Jingjing Qian, covers this and much more in her recent blog. Here, I draw on her and the report's conclusions, and examine the implications.

In short, when life deals you lemons, make lemonade. China is likely the world's largest emitter of carbon dioxide (CO2), and heavily reliant on fossil fuels. Even under the most aggressive, plausible scenarios of green and energy efficient development, fossil fuels (coal, in particular) still play far too large a role for us to breathe a sigh of relief when it comes to global warming. We need to reduce emissions from fossil fuels, and fast. CCS offers such an option.

Can CCS work in China? The answer seems to be a resounding "yes", for a number of reasons. The price tag for projects will be cheaper in China, due to lower labor, material and fuel costs. There are numerous large point sources where CO2 could be captured, in many cases cheaply (because of their high concentration). China's geology is conducive to sequestering this CO2 geologically, and could accommodate centuries worth of emissions on first examination. Transporting the CO2 from source to sink is far easier than in other parts of the world, since there is very good geographical matching between the two in many cases. The Chinese have made very encouraging moves, both in terms of developing proprietary CCS technology and in terms of pioneering projects within China's boundaries that either incorporate or lend themselves to CCS. China's policy and regulatory framework could be expanded to encompass CCS. Some, or many, of these factors cannot be found in several other parts of the world, making China a special opportunity when it comes to CCS.

Will CCS be taken up spontaneously in China, then? The answer is no. Without international involvement, China by itself is very unlikely to deploy this technology on any significant scale. The first missing component is funding. The second is technological expertise and knowledge transfer. And the third is a domestic policy and regulatory framework. Developed countries and corporations can fill these gaps.

The funding gap is relevant to the Major Economies Forum, to the global climate accord being sought in Copenhagen in December, and to a potential bilateral technology agreement between China and the U.S.. CCS is likely to be part of agreements that come out of all three forums, and has strong potential to pave the way for agreement on a broader climate deal between the two countries.

The technological know-how and expertise gap, (e.g. in areas such as reservoir engineering, CO2 pipeline construction and operation, subsurface modelling and monitoring) can be bridged most productively if Chinese and Western scientists, engineers and practicioners collaborate hands-on in the context of specific pilot projects.

The policy and regulatory gap is one that China will need to address itself, but related experiences from other countries' governments and regulators can prove invaluable. China does things its own way in the end, but its officials certainly look for ideas abroad.

Where to, from here? China's low-hanging fruit CCS opportunities are ripe for the picking. For a modest sum ($100M), the U.S. could help set up quickly 4-5 CCS pilot projects using high purity CO2 streams, spanning five years or so each, that could be pioneering on many fronts: knowledge and technology transfer and building, better geologic characterization of China's key sedimentary basins, and relationship building between the two heavyweights across the Pacific. The Major Economies Forum, and nations in Copenhagen in December, could then cement a deal that includes funding for a certain CCS capacity, arrangements for technology and knowledge transfer, as well as institutional exchange.

Next year is the Year of the Tiger - time for bold action. Lemonade, anyone?

Is the Future(Gen) here?

2009-06-12T18:30:16Z

George Peridas, Scientist, Climate Center – San Francisco

FutureGen is alive. DOE Secretary Chu today announced an agreement with the FutureGen Alliance, the industrial consortium involved in the project, that moves the ball forward on its construction. This comes after several months of limbo, after the previous administration had decided to "restructure" the project because of escalating costs, which essentially put it in the freezer.

Sec. Chu should be commended for his prompt efforts in this area, and for finally honoring DOE's initial commitment from years ago to develop this project. The reputation of the U.S. government suffered when the project seemed destined for cancellation, with the international community questioning whether the U.S. was truly committed to advancing the deployment of Carbon Capture & Sequestration (CCS) technology. Today's announcement restores credibility in the government's efforts.

The broader question still remains, however. How big of a deal is this announcement, and what impact will it have on CCS deployment? As welcome as today's news might be, the fact remains that FutureGen still is "too much future, and too little gen", as David Hawkins had previously remarked. It is one of many projects out there, and does not hold the keys to CCS deployment.

The main reason is that the key barriers to CCS are not technological, but economic. In fact, there is a number of proposed commercial projects out there (by Hydrogen Energy, Tenaska, Summit Power and others) that are testament to the readiness of the technology, and most of which would feature a higher percentage of capture and sequestration than today's announcement suggests for FutureGen. The task at hand is not to "develop" or "prove" the technology, but to ensure that there is a market that will draw private sector investment. What CCS needs is a supportive policy framework that will place a price on carbon emissions and bridge the initial economic gap for CCS with targeted incentives.

There is a proposal in Congress that would do just that: the Waxman-Markey American Clean Energy & Security Act. Without a climate bill, CCS is at a dead end, and any DOE money spent on it will have been in vain. The House will be voting on the bill in the next few weeks. Let's hope that members will follow the lead of the Energy & Commerce committee, and make the right choice for our economy, energy security and our planet's health.

Empleos Verdes

2009-04-17T06:30:26Z

George Peridas, Scientist, Climate Center – San Francisco

"No es fácil ser verde". La rana René ("It's not easy being green". Kermit the frog)

Seemingly, it is also hard for Foxes to be green. Shannon Bream at least seems to be having a tough time of it right now, and recently pitched a Spanish study showing that "for every green job created [in Spain], 2.2 jobs are lost", casting doubt on President Obama's green energy plans. As my colleague Pete Altman describes, even the business minded Wall Street Journal raised serious doubts about the validity of the study.

But another great irony was lost in the story, which I'd like to point out. The very policies and companies that have created green jobs in Spain have also created green jobs here in the U.S. How? It all starts with Spain's renewable electricity tariff.

Spain supports renewables through a feed-in tariff, which is considered among the most successful in Europe. From very modest beginnings, wind farms now abound in the Spanish countryside, and the country has the third largest installed capacity in the world. The market leader in wind turbines in Spain, Gamesa, fueled its growth on the back of this tariff to supply the domestic market - a classic example of business creation as a result of government policies.

Gamesa has now taken its success abroad, supplying turbines to 20 countries in total, and employing over 7,000 people in 2009. 300 or so of those are in Cambria County, PA. According to a report from the Spanish Trade Commission, Gamesa has said that it plans to bring all its wind turbine blade manufacturing activity to the company's plant in Pennsylvania by spring. Call me simplistic but, in the midst of a recession, we should be thankful for this and for the Spanish policies that drove the development of this industry.

Is it too much of a stretch to see that similar policies here in the U.S. that drive low carbon technologies, will also boost U.S. companies to create U.S. jobs? Is it not rather obvious that if the U.S. does not lead in this arena, other countries and their companies will? Why should Pennsylvania get its jobs from Spain?

Fortunately, President Obama does not suffer from the angst that plagues Kermit. We look forward to more good, stable, green jobs, and not the same old plate Breaming with Prof. Calzada's libertarian paella.

Waxman-Markey: Breaking the Deadlock on CCS

2009-04-03T07:09:38Z

George Peridas, Scientist, Climate Center – San Francisco

The press seems to cover Carbon Capture & Storage (CCS) as a matter of routine these days - local, national and international. For someone who hasn't looked at the technology in detail, it can be hard to decipher its potential role, status and readiness. Things get even more confusing when policy debates enter the picture. Fortunately, reality is simpler.

Although it is often portrayed as a novel technology, few realize that CCS is something that has been tried before. Nature stored CO2 and other fluids in the subsurface well before we thought of it, often for millions to hundreds of millions of years (the age of oil fields). We have been operating a few CCS projects for a number of years now. Other closely related industrial activities such as natural gas storage and enhanced oil recovery have been ongoing for decades. The IPCC and MIT completed comprehensive studies that summarize the status of the technology a couple of years ago.

So where does it stand? The truth is that CCS technology is ready to begin deployment at large, commercial scale today. Why are there no commercial coal-fired power plants (the sector with the largest emissions and in most urgent need of CCS, but certainly not the only possible application) in operation today that capture and store their carbon, you might ask? Well, "it's the economy, stupid"... It makes no sense to invest in such a plant if there are no limits in carbon emissions in place or a price associated with venting your CO2 to the atmosphere. What muddies the waters sometimes is the reluctance of some in the coal and electric utility industries to phase out construction of conventional coal plants and replace them with plants that capture and sequester their emissions. They have argued, conveniently, that the technology is not proven and that, until it is, we should not cap emissions as it would mean a blow to the coal sector and the hence the economy. Other industry leaders, however, have been saying for some time now that the technology is available to reduce emissions today if the economic and legal issues are rectified. Companies like BP, Hydrogen Energy, NRG, and Tenaska have stated so clearly. They were effectively joined in January by the entirety of the U.S. Climate Action Partnership (USCAP), which included very specific recommendations to address the barriers to CCS deployment and coal plants. The bulk of those requirements have now been included in the Waxman-Markey Energy & Climate discussion draft. Let's take a closer look.

Sections 111-113 deal with the legal needs and barriers to CCS, andfill regulatory and other gaps on the logistics of permitting CCS projects. Section 111 calls for a study of legal and regulatory barriers to CCS that could be addressed by Federal agencies in the immediate term, so that these agencies can get going. Next, as you might be aware, EPA is in the midst of a Safe Drinking Water Act rulemaking right now for geologic sequestration of CO2 using underground wells for the purposes of protecting underground sources of drinking water. Section 112 directs EPA to issue a unified regulatory framework for CCS that safeguards human health and the environment, and also prevents atmospheric releases from subsurface reservoirs including hydrocarbon reservoirs. It also establishes authority for financial responsibility provisions for injection sites, for which EPA has limited authority currently. In other words, this section expands EPA's authority to fill current gaps or ambiguities. The next section, Section 113 calls for a report to be produced by an EPA-convened task force that studies legal and statutory issues relating to CCS and produces consensus recommendations if possible. DOE, with FERC's assistance, is to produce a study on CO2 pipeline needs and barriers.

Then we move on to economic and technological issues. Section 114 mirrors a bill that Rep. Boucher introduced last year (the Carbon Capture and Storage Early Deployment Act - see our testimony), and sets up a Carbon Storage Research Corporation that is tasked with the research and development of new CCS technologies, as well as a limited number of early demonstrations. The Corporation is funded through a small "wires charge" on existing fossil generation. A 10-year carbon assessment program is to be established to generate between $1-1.1bn of revenue annually and used to fund early commercial scale demonstrations of capture or storage.

Section 115, however, goes a step further and contains a funding mechanism for commercial CCS plants, which are unlikely to be economical under the lower carbon prices in the early years of a carbon cap. The section establishes a program for the broad commercial deployment of CCS-equipped power plants and certain other industrial sources. 85% of funds are reserved for power plants above 250MW that derive at least 50% of fuel input from coal and/or pet coke. 15% of funds are reserved for industrial sources emitting over 250,000 tons of CO2 per year and excludes producers of fossil-based transportation fuel. Payments are awarded according to a declining fixed feed in approach, based on tons of CO2 captured, that rewards higher payments for higher rates of capture as determined by EPA (payment rates yet to be determined but to be set based on reduced cost of compliance, capture technology, and other factors). The payment period is not yet specified, nor is the total capacity deployed. This mechanism avoids the risk involved in handing out allowances whose value would vary, thus making the incentive more bankable and predictable. If the funding levels are set right, this section would address the biggest stumbling block for CCS plants and bridge the economic gap. What about safeguarding against new conventional coal, though?

This where Section 116 comes in, which sets performance standards for new coal-fired power plants, effective from January 1st 2009 for facilities that have not received their permits. Those plants have to emit less than 1,100 pounds of CO2 per MWh if permitted after 2015, 800 pounds of CO2 per MWh or lower (if EPA so determines) if permitted after 2020. For plants permitted between 2009-2015 they will have to comply with 1,100 pounds of CO2 per MWh (just over the emissions rate of a modern natural gas plant) within 4 years if modest amounts of CCS plants are operational in the U.S. and internationally (2.5GW or 5 mn tons sequestered per year in the U.S.; or 5GW and 10mn tons sequestered globally per year, provided there are 2mn tons at least sequestered in the U.S.). This section therefore ensures that we do not continue on the dangerous path of constructing new coal plants that do not capture and sequester their emissions.

The Waxman-Markey draft therefore ensures the phase out of the most serious threat to meeting emission reduction limits - conventional coal-fired power plants - and provides a financial mechanism to move us to the next generation of plants that capture and dispose of their carbon. It also addresses outstanding legal issues and barriers. For those who claim that CCS needs another 15 years of research before it can be deployed, the race is on. The incentives will flow to those who are ready to claim them first, and our assessment is that major contracts would be signed within months of enactment.

What remains? Important details (such as the exact funding levels) need to be filled in of course. There is also work to be done on the issue of subsurface (pore) property rights to clarify ownership and dominance of estates - but states have to do that. Federal and State regulators also have to build staff and expertise on CCS, which means being appropriately funded. Overall though, the draft seems poised to finally break the deadlock in CCS and setting the stage for deployment at a scale that would make a meaningful dent in CO2 emissions. Chairmen Waxman and Markey deserve praise for their thoughtful treatment of the subject.

Now, there are a number of "FAQs" that arise around a topic like this. Each deserves a blog of its own, but let me at least provide some links and initial thoughts here.

If you are concerned about the safety of CCS, I urge you to read the IPCC and MIT reports that I mention above, as well as a series of other publications by the IEA and others. A bibliography can be found here, along with powerpoints from two public workshops that we co-hosted on the subject a few weeks ago.

If you are wondering why we need CCS when cleaner, truly sustainable solutions such as energy efficiency and renewables are available, the answer is urgency of action on climate change, the dominant role of coal in our electricity production today (close to 50% of supply) and politics. We simply cannot afford to take low carbon options off the table if we are to reduce emissions sufficiently in time to prevent dangerous climate change. Yes, other solutions are preferable to CCS, and should exploited first. NRDC has steadily advocated this, and the draft bill contains provisions that ensure the deployment of those technologies too (see David Doniger's blog).

Finally, CCS does not legitimize coal use nor does it make coal "clean". It simply disposes of its CO2 when otherwise it would have been emitted to the atmosphere. Despite millions of dollars being spent by industry outfits to perpetuate the myth of "clean" coal, we are far from it on a number of fronts: dangerous, abusive and poorly regulated mining practices, coal combustion waste management (the coal ash spill in Tennessee is still fresh in our memories) and emission of conventional pollutants like SOx and NOx and mercury from smokestacks. The toll from coal is heavy. And CO2 scrubbing is no absolution. But it is a necessity if we are to stop global warming. (For an analysis of these issues, read David Hawkins' recent Congressional testimony)

Boreal Burial

2009-02-18T09:26:56Z

George Peridas, Scientist, Climate Center – San Francisco

As is customary, President Obama will make his first state visit to Canada this week. Prime Minister Harper will no doubt be waiting eagerly. There is a lot to talk about.

Energy security will be high on both leaders' list. To quote President Obama's predecessor, America is addicted to oil. And Canada, the gentle, friendly neighbor from the North can provide it. Lots of it. When tar sands are included in the resource base, Canada is second only to Saudi Arabia in oil wealth. Now, President Obama started his term on a stronger environmental footing than many, if not all, previous presidents, directing his agencies to pave the way towards cleaner, more fuel-efficient cars. What will he make of the Canadian tar sands, which are turned into oil in one of the most environmentally abusive and greenhouse gas intensive processes in use today?

In talking to the CBC yesterday, the president was well aware of the high carbon footprint associated with tar sands oil, and appeared committed to address it. What can be done about all the additional carbon dioxide from tar sands production and processing? The answer for tar sands proponents is to bury it underground in geologic reservoirs. A 21st century solution. Or is it? The answer is not quite that simple for the tar sands unfortunately.

First, although Carbon Capture & Sequestration (CCS) technology is available today to begin deployment today in some industrial sectors, the tar sands pose unique challenges. The reason is very eloquently summarised in a recent report written by an expert task force for the Alberta and the Federal governments:

"However, oil sands operations are very diverse (both geographically and technically) and only a small portion of the CO2 streams are currently amenable for CCS due to both the size of emissions streams and the concentrations. The problem is that lower concentration or smaller emission streams are more costly to capture because of the additional unit capital and operating costs (including energy use) associated with the capture, separation, and purification processes. The earliest oil sands opportunities are the bitumen upgrading facilities that use steam methane reforming or gasification technology and which produce higher concentration CO2 streams"

In other words, many of the golden rules of CCS are violated: there are many emission sources within a plant instead of one large one; plants are not standardized, with each utilizing slightly different technology; only one plant today uses gasification which produces a highly concentrated stream that is more amenable to capture; the diversity of locations makes investing in and building a pipeline more challenging. Is CCS then not a hope for the tar sands? It could be, and it should be a required practice to clean up existing operations - but it is not by any means an easy application of the technology or a foregone conclusion. CCS in the tar sands is more challenging than in the power sector, and we should be thinking very carefully about when, and if, it might be making a material difference to the carbon footprint of tar sands oil. Also, regardless of how much carbon could be reduced from its production, we are also still left with the downstream emissions from its combustion by cars, trucks and planes, unlike the power sector where the final electrons have been stripped of most of their carbon.

Second, production of oil from tar sands is wrought with a host of other environmental problems - greenhouse gases are only part of the worry, and CCS can barely absolve the sands' other sins. If President Obama were to take the trip to Fort McMurray as I did just over a year ago to tour the scene of the crime, he would hard pressed not to be as shocked and appalled as I was. No amount of reading can prepare you for the real thing. From deforestation, strip mining, waterway pollution and huge freshwater withdrawals to toxic air emissions, wildlife disturbance and severe disruption of indigenous communities and their environment, this tarry El Dorado can scarcely fit inside the technological cure confession box. This is not to say that technology cannot significantly improve current practices. It can, and it should, on many of these problematic fronts. But this is no slam dunk, especially when the driver for improvement is a post hotly contested by... the free market and the regulatory authorities of Alberta. It hardly fills one with confidence.

Which brings me to the third, and perhaps most important, point: it would be short sighted of the U.S. to sign off on the tar sands as environmentally acceptable by investing in technological development and improvement, either domestically only, or in cooperation with Canada. The heart of the problem with tar sands is adequate regulation, oversight and enforcement. The track record to date leaves a great deal to be desired, to put it very mildly. No matter how hard Mr. Harper tries to sell the process as modern and benign, the U.S. should be taking the lead in enforcing adequate protection measures for a treasure that does not just belong to Alberta or Canada but to the whole planet and to future generations, one of the world's last undisturbed ecosystems: the Boreal Forest. It is U.S. demand that is driving its destruction. Now it is time for the U.S. to assume responsibility for its protection too. Offloading the responsibility for good stewardship to the Canadian authorities and looking away would be a big mistake.

The answer lies not in carbon dioxide burial or other technological fixes, but in the very solutions that President Obama has prudently and repeatedly stressed for both their environmental and economic benefits. Clean energy sources and fuels. Efficient cars. The boreal forest itself is highly skilled at sequestering carbon - if only we let it be.

Connecting the Dots: U.S. CO2 Emissions

2008-12-05T12:28:58Z

George Peridas, Scientist, Climate Center – San Francisco

Has a sunny morning in the middle of winter ever fooled you into thinking that spring has arrived? Or a brief let-up in traffic made you think that the jam was over? Do you remember back to your high school days and your science experiments, when you were plotting out data points on a graph and drawing straight lines through them? Apparently President Bush doesn't recall back that far. Instead, he prefers to deduce trends by looking at single data points, ignoring the rest of the graph...

The issue in question here? U.S. carbon dioxide emissions, the gas chiefly responsible for causing global warming. In 2006, the second warmest year on record in the U.S., emissions dropped compared to 2005 levels, causing an exultant President Bush, who until relatively recently of course did not accept that global warming was real or caused by human emissions, to claim victory. The Washington Post quoted him saying that "We are effectively confronting the important challenge of global climate change through regulations, public-private partnerships, incentives, and strong economic investment. [...] New policies at the federal, state, and local levels -- such as my initiative to reduce by 20 percent our projected use of gasoline within 10 years -- promise even more progress."

Not so fast, Mr. President. A quick look at emission trends from previous years paints a very different picture. Incoporating 2007 data from DOE-EIA's recent (Dec 2008) report on U.S. emissions, the trend looks like this:

Yes, emissions have been growing steadily for decades now in an unquestionable upward trend, with only a couple of downward blips since 1990. It seems that Mr. Bush needs to revisit his old science textbooks after his term is over and he has more free time in his hands. In fact, DOE's Energy Information Administration last year projected that carbon dioxide emissions between 2006-2030 in the U.S. will grow by 16%. The reference case for the 2009 Annual Energy Outlook is scheduled for release on Dec 17, 2008. Yet again it is expected to reaffirm the same alarming trend: without concerted policies to reduce global warming emissions, the steady climb is going to continue. The longer we wait before we take action, the harder it will be to reduce atmospheric CO2 levels to acceptable levels. The time to stop this uncontrolled experiment is now. Let's hope that the new Congress and Administration will listen to the world's scientists and act decisively.